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protected by pension rights, seniority, or perhaps unemployment
compensation, his job and his fifth amendment rights will not be
protected.
Janet L. Zoltanski

CRIMINAL LAW-APPELLATE REVIEW-BASIC

AND FUNDAMENTAL

ERROR-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that allegations of basic and fundamental error will no longer enable appellants in criminal cases to seek reversal for alleged errors not properly
raised in the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272 (Pa. 1974).
Alvin Clair was convicted of murder in the second degree and, on
direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, sought reversal
for error in the trial judge's charge to the jury. Clair contended that
the judge invaded the jury's province, prejudiced him while reviewing the testimony, and erroneously instructed the jury on the law.'
Appellant's counsel did not object at trial to the alleged errors;
nevertheless, Clair claimed the errors were basic and fundamental
and could be reviewed by the court despite the failure to preserve
them below. The court rejected this argument and, overruling precedents on which appellant had relied on appeal, abrogated the
doctrine of basic and fundamental error in criminal cases.2
The Clair court pointed to the difficulty of determining which
errors are basic and fundamental and to the anomalous situation
created: while all reversible error is not basic and fundamental there
is no readily apparent difference between themA Furthermore, the
court noted that in Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co.,' it had
abrogated the fundamental error doctrine in civil cases. There the
court had reasoned that the doctrine excused inadequate preparation and discouraged alert professional representation, penalized
the opposing party, denied the trial court the opportunity to correct
the error, impaired the finality of trial court holdings and encour1. Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272, 273 (Pa. 1974).
2. Id. at 274. Justice Nix wrote the opinion for the court.
3. Id. at 273.
4. 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
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aged trivial appeals.' The Claircourt concluded that these considerations were equally pertinent in criminal cases and, since the rules
of civil procedure and criminal procedure each require timely objections to preserve error for appeal,' no distinction would be made for
purposes of the fundamental error doctrine. The court bolstered its
decision by pointing out that due process defects in a defendant's
trial are more properly remedied in a post-conviction proceeding
through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.! The court did
not restrict its holding to errors in jury charges but held the fundamental error doctrine could no longer be used to obtain review of
unobjected-to errors in the presentation of evidence.'
The Clair dissenters argued that the analogy between civil and
criminal cases was tenuous. Asserting that the fundamental error
doctrine was designed to assure a fair trial to every defendant, they
criticized a rule which would penalize defendant and counsel for
inevitable human errors.? They also disputed the majority's reliance
on the need for judicial economy, maintaining that the majority's
proposed alternative would lead merely to more appeals from postconviction hearings on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
with no net savings of judicial resources.' 0
THE PRE-Clair STATUS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR DOCTRINE IN
PENNSYLVANIA

As a general rule, appellate courts will not review allegations of
errors that were not properly preserved by objection or exception. 1'
5. Id. at 257-59, 322 A.2d at 116-17.
6. The rules of civil and criminal procedure both apply to charges to the jury and require
that objection be made before the jury retires. PA. R. Civ. P. 227; PA. R. CRIM. P. 1119.
Although Dilliplaineapplied only to error in jury instructions, it should be noted that Clair
applies both to those errors and to errors in the presentation of evidence.
7. 326 A.2d at 274.
8. Appellant also contended that during the trial he had been prejudiced by improper
questioning of a witness. Defense counsel had not objected to the testimony when it was given
and had not made a motion to have it stricken. Id.
9. Id. at 275.
10. Id.
11. Commonwealth v. Delfino, 259 Pa. 272, 102 A. 949 (1918); Commonwealth v. Polichinus, 229 Pa. 311, 78 A. 382 (1910); Commonwealth v. Razmus, 210 Pa. 609, 60 A. 264
(1905); 5 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2253 (1957); Note,

Operation of Appellate Procedure in Pennsylvania Criminal Cases, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 868
(1952). This contemporaneous objection rule applies to alleged errors occurring at all stages
of the trial. Commonwealth v. Del Giorno, 303 Pa. 509, 154 A. 786 (1931) (trial judge's
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This rule seeks to discourage the withholding of objections solely to
assure a basis for appeal and to preserve judicial resources by
having all claims of error presented in a timely fashion so that the
trial judge may take corrective action. The interests of the judicial
system, however, may conflict with the interests of criminal defendants. Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts had recognized, in the doctrine of basic and fundamental error, an exception to the strict
requirements of the general rule. In exceptional cases, courts were
willing to overlook a mistake or inadvertance of trial counsel and
review unpreserved error that jeopardized the fundamental fairness
3
of a defendant's trial.
To support his claim that the court could review an unpreserved
but fundamental error, Clair relied on the court's recent leading
decision in Commonwealth v. Williams.4 The Williams decision,
however, must be analyzed in conjunction with Commonwealth v.
Scoleri, 5 which was handed down on the same day and dealt also
with failure to object to errors. Critics of the doctrine charged that
its application in these cases led to inconsistent results."5 In Clair
the court vindicated such criticism by approvingly citing Justice
participation in cross-examination); Commonwealth v. Luccitti, 295 Pa. 190, 145 A. 85 (1928)
(error in the introduction of evidence); Commonwealth v. Scherer, 266 Pa. 210, 109 A. 867
(1920) (jury instructions).
12. See Commonwealth v. Razmus, 210 Pa. 609, 611, 60 A. 264, 265 (1905): "A party may
not sit silent and take his chances of a verdict, and then if it is adverse complain of a matter
which if an error would have been immediately rectified and made harmless."
13. See Comment, Appeal of Errorsin the Absence of Objection-Pennsylvania's"Fundamental Error" Doctrine, 73 DicK. L. REv. 496 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. In
Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968), the court restated the general
rule and the fundamental error exception:
[Int is a well established general rule that an appellate Court will not reverse (1) on a
point (a) where no exception was taken by appellant; or (b) to which only a general
exception was taken; or (2) on a ground not raised in or by the Court below.
However, this general rule will not be applied where there is basic and fundamental
error which affects the merits or justice of the case, or . . . offends against the fundamentals of a fair and impartial trial, or deprives a defendant of "'that fundamental
fairness essential to the very concept of justice,' and hence, denies him due process of
law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." This exception to the general rule is
always applied where a defendant's life or liberty is at stake.
Id. at 563-64, 248 A.2d at 304-05 (citations omitted).
14. 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).
15. 432 Pa. 571, 248 A.2d 295, vacated in part on other grounds, Scoleri v. Pennsylvania,
408 U.S. 934 (1968).
16. See Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 387, 248 A.2d 289 (1968) (Roberts, J.,
opinion in support of the order); Comment, supra note 13, at 496-501.
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Roberts' dissent in Williams," thereby effectively overruling that
case. A discussion of these cases would now be in order. 8
In Williams the court found fundamental error in a confusing
charge that permitted the jury to convict even though it entertained
a reasonable doubt." In Scoleri the court affirmed the conviction
despite a claim of denial of access to counsel during a mid-day
recess in the trial.2 0 The policy of guaranteeing a fair trial which
underlies the fundamental error doctrine would seem to require sim17. 326 A.2d at 273, citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 569-70, 248 A.2d 301,
307 (1968) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Justice Roberts consistently opposed the use of the doctrine, objecting to the test of severity
of the error and to the "subjective" nature of the inquiry. He proposed an alternative "correctible" standard focusing on counsel's opportunity to raise the error at trial and the trial
judge's ability to correct the error:
First, the relevant standard must be not how severe was the error, but how easily can
it be corrected. . . .Then, this Court will reverse for (1) those errors which were so
severe that any attempt to correct them could not dispel the earlier taint and (2) those
objections which the trial court overruled and which we find meritorious.
Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 390-91, 248 A.2d 289, 291 (1968) (Roberts, J., opinion
in support of the order).
Justice Roberts speaks of "severe" error and "taint," but he does not precisely define his
test. Writers who had some difficulty in interpreting the test have suggested that the Justice
proposed two tests: 1) that the appellate court will never reverse on unpreserved error, and
2) that the court may reverse if it determines that an objection at trial would have been
useless because no action by the judge could have corrected the error. Comment, supra note
13, at 496. However, language in Simon seems to better support the interpretation that
appellate courts will review claims of error only if they were preserved below by an objection
that was either sustained, although judicial corrective action was ineffective, or overruled.
Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 391, 248 A.2d 289, 291 (1968) (Roberts, J., opinion in
support of the order) ("[W]e must insist that counsel object to all of those events which
counsel alleges to be error.
...
) (emphasis added). Thus Justice Roberts' alternative was
theoretically a very strict standard aimed at defense counsel's strategies to preserve grounds
for appeal.
18. Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 248 A.2d 289 (1968) was a companion case to
Williams and Scoleri which also dealt with unpreserved error. There the appellant, who had
been tried for murder, contended that the judge incorrectly instructed the jury that a finding
of intent to kill would preclude a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 387, 248 A.2d at
289. Simon's conviction was affirmed per curiam without opinion by an evenly divided court.
Justice Roberts filed an "opinion in support of the order." Justice O'Brien dissented, addressing only the reasoning of Justice Roberts' opinion. Id. at 396, 248 A.2d at 293. Because the
court gave no rationale for its decision, Simon itself is not so clearly subject to criticism as
are Williams and Scoleri.
19. 432 Pa. at 567, 248 A.2d at 306.
20. Scoleri had taken the stand to testify on his own behalf and, as midday approached,
he was still on direct examination. Before adjourning for lunch, the court admonished Scoleri
that he was not to discuss the case with anyone, including his attorney, during the break.
Counsel did not object at that time to the admonition. Id. at 575, 248 A.2d at 296-97.
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ilar disposition of Williams and Scoleri. The right asserted in
Williams-to have the state bear the burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt-is part of the fair trial required by due process." The right to assistance of counsel asserted in Scoleri is an
enumerated federal constitutional right and, in Pennsylvania, has
been held to encompass the right to consult counsel while the court
is in recess."
Critics of the fundamental error doctrine attributed the inconsistent results to the court's failure to express its standards adequately. 3 Case law had shown that determinative factors could include not only the type of error involved,' but also the ease with
which trial counsel could have raised the error 5 and the grossness
of the error.26 In other words, the court apparently took an ad hoc
approach" that arguably led to increased expenditures of time and
appeal funds."
That the doctrine could be unwieldy or unpredictable does not
negate its potential usefulness in assuring a fair trial. In Williams,
for example, had the appellate court adopted a strict view and re21. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
22. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967) (admonition that defendant not discuss case with his attorney during lunch recess constituted reversible error even
without a showing of prejudice).
23. See Comment, supra note 13, at 506-07, suggesting that the court, to meet criticism
of the doctrine, articulate its standards and expose the logic of each of its decisions dealing
with fundamental error. For example, the court failed to justify the treatment of the claim
in Scoleri despite precedent that seemed to mandate a different result. See note 22 supra.
The decision, however, may have been influenced by Scoleri's three trials for the same offense
(all ending in convictions imposing the death sentence). But see Commonwealth v. Simon,
432 Pa. 386, 397, 248 A.2d 289, 294 (1968) (O'Brien, J., dissenting) where an attempt at
articulating standards was made. There Justice O'Brien implied that where the evidence only
barely supports the verdict any error would have a prejudicial effect and therefore would be
basic and fundamental.
24. Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A.2d 301 (1968).
25. See Commonwealth v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 305 A.2d 14 (1973) (prosecutor asked
leading questions; no fundamental error).
26. Compare Commonwealth v. Thompson, 444 Pa. 312, 317, 281 A.2d 856, 858 (1971)
(Pomeroy, J., concurring) (fundamental error where trial judge abruptly terminated proceedings and adjudicated defendant guilty without opportunity to call witnesses or have counsel
present arguments) with Commonwealth v. Glover, 446 Pa. 492, 286 A.2d 349 (1972) (no
fundamental error where judge allowed impeachment of appellant's credibility but not that
of adverse witness).
27. Comment, Basic and Fundamental Error: The Right Result for the Wrong Reason,
43 TEMp. L.Q. 228, 228-29 (1970) [hereinafter cited as TEMPLE Comment].
28. Comment, supra note 13, at 501; cf. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 856 (1969).
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quired objection below to preserve the claim of error, the conviction
would have stood even though, under the jury charge given, the
29
state might not have proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The doctrine of fundamental error thus served a valid function from
the defendant's viewpoint." The Clair court apparently concluded
that the same aim of encouraging professional competence and judicial efficiency that led to the abrogation of the doctrine in civil cases
outweighed the potential benefits to criminal defendants.
VALIDITY OF THE

DilliplaineRATIONALE

AS A BASIS FOR

Clair

The decision in Dilliplainev. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 3 abrogating the fundamental error doctrine in civil cases, was based on the
court's perception of practical problems that it felt made the doctrine unworkable in a modern judicial system. The court concluded
that the doctrine was not a principled test, but was a vehicle harmful to the trial and appellate process, used for arbitrary reversal
according to the predilections of a majority of the court. 3 The major
emphasis was placed on the doctrine's effect on preparation by the
attorney and on the caseload of appellate courts; excusing the failure to preserve error condoned poor preparation by attorneys and
penalized the opposing party. 33 The court did not distinguish between deliberate and inadvertent failure to object, but strongly suggested that any failure could only be seen as falling short of the alert
34
professional representation to be demanded of the bar.
The Dilliplainerationale does not provide a valid basis for Clair.
Since in a civil case a party is usually represented by an attorney
35
of his choice, binding him to omissions of his counsel is justifiable.
That result is not so readily acceptable in criminal cases. As the
29. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
30. The court apparently made few attempts to redefine the nature of the fundamental
error doctrine. Several possible alternative approaches were available. See note 17 supra for
Justice Roberts' proposals, and TEMPLE Comment, supra note 27, at 233-37, proposing two
others: 1) hearing any claim of error on direct appeal, and 2) hearing claims of unpreserved
error if they assert an enumerated constitutional right.
31. 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
32. Id. at 257, 322 A.2d at 116.
33. Id., 322 A.2d at 116.
34. Id. at.258, 322 A.2d at 116.
35. The decision to impose a stricter standard of preparation and conduct on attorneys
in civil cases comports with traditional conceptions of the adversary system and a party's
identification with his attorney.
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Clair dissenters noted,3" a great number of criminal defendants are
indigent and represented by counsel whom they have not personally
chosen. Although it is clear that a criminal defendant may be bound
by actions of his counsel taken as part of a deliberate trial strategy,"
penalizing appellants for all failures to object ignores the relative
weakness of the average criminal defendant vis &vis the state. It is
also obvious that in criminal cases the interest at stake is the life
or liberty of the defendant; arguably this should weigh more heavily
than the pecuniary interests which are at stake in civil cases.
The application of the Dilliplainerationale to criminal cases also
slights the origins of the doctrine of basic and fundamental error.
Admittedly, the general rule restricting the scope of appellate review to preserved error sought to prevent parties from trying to
assure grounds for appeal by failing to raise an objection at trial.3"
The fundamental error exception was conceived not as condonation
of such tactics, but as a guarantee of fundamental fairness. 9 As the
Clair and Dilliplaine dissenters intimated," in abrogating the doctrine in criminal cases the majority may have over-emphasized the
flaws in the doctrine without giving sufficient weight to its underlying purpose or to the interests it sought to protect.
THE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR DOCTRINE

With Clair, a shift in perspective has taken place. The fundamental error doctrine had provided a limited means on direct appeal of
correcting egregious trial errors for which the defendant could not
always be held responsible. The effect of Clairwill be to delay relief
until the defendant can file a petition for a post-conviction hearing
and prove not that his trial was unfair, but that his attorney's conduct was not minimally competent.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel" is one basis for relief
36. 326 A.2d at 275.
37. Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 452 Pa. 185, 299 A.2d 254 (1973).
38. See text at note 12 supra.
39. Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 563-64, 248 A.2d 301, 304-05 (1968).
40. Commonwealth v. Clair, 326 A.2d 272, 275 (Pa. 1974) (Pomeroy, Eagen & O'Brien,
JJ., dissenting); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 264, 322 A.2d 114, 119
(1974) (Pomeroy & Eagen, JJ., dissenting).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(6) (Supp. 1975) provides that a petitioner is eligible
for relief if he can show "[t]he denial of his constitutional right to representation by competent counsel."
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under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Hearing Act.4" The standard used to judge the claim was set forth in Commonwealth ex rel.
Washington v. Maroney," where the court held that counsel's assistance is "effective" if there is some reasonable basis for his conduct.
The attorney's chosen course is examined in light of all available
alternatives, but the outcome does not depend on whether the most
reasonable alternative was taken; the balance will tip in favor of
finding effective assistance of counsel as soon as the court finds any
reasonable basis for counsel's actions." Ineffective assistance of
counsel has also been defined as that assistance which is a "mockery
of justice,"45 "so insubstantial . . . as to cast doubt on the hypothesis that counsel made a deliberate informed choice," and not
"within the permissible range of prudent representation of a client's
interests. 4 7 However phrased, the standard implies a presumption
in favor of finding competence of counsel.' 8 Under the fundamental
error doctrine the defendant had to show that the unobjected-to
error denied him a fair trial, but there was no presumption in favor
of the state. Clair seems to add a burden to the defendant that he
did not bear when alleging fundamental error.
It is questionable that Clairwill ease the difficulty of determining
when unpreserved error will entitle a defendant to relief. The standard that the Claircourt termed more workable than the fundamental error test seems to suffer from similar infirmities. As criteria,
42. Id. §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp. 1975). The act encompasses the writ of habeas corpus and
provides a uniform procedure for post-conviction proceedings.
43. 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). In Maroney the court found that counsel's failure to
object to admission of an allegedly coerced confession, on which the Commonwealth's entire
case rested, was explained most satisfactorily by insufficient preparation by the defense
counsel, a member of the Legal Aid Society. Two other actions by counsel, failure to investigate prior convictions of an accomplice in order to impeach his testimony and failure to
investigate possible witnesses, were held to be valid trial decisions. Id. at 601, 609-11, 235 A.2d
at 351, 355-56.
44. Id. at 604-05, 235 A.2d at 352-53.
45. Id. at 602, 235 A.2d at 351; Commonwealth v. Heard, 224 Pa. Super. 216, 217, 303
A.2d 831, 832 (1973).
46. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352
(1967). See also Commonwealth v. Hill, 450 Pa. 477, 480, 301 A,2d 587, 588 (1973) (where
challenged jury instruction was fair and neutral, defendant's counsel was not ineffective
because of failure to object to the charge).
47. Commonwealth v. Ganss, 440 Pa. 602, 606, 271 A.2d 224, 226 (1970) (where counsel
was attempting to avoid the imposition of the death penalty, failure to object was a tactic
within the permissible range of prudent representation).
48. See Lee, Right to Effective Counsel: A JudicialHeuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 28788 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lee].
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"insubstantial assistance," "permissible range of prudent representation," and "mockery of justice" are no more concrete than "fundamental fairness." The real test for ineffective assistance of counsel should probably be widely-held, established standards of professional conduct and judgment in criminal cases. That as a practical
matter such standards do not exist49 weakens the court's assertion
that an old unworkable test has been discarded for a more meaningful test.50
Further, it is unlikely that claims of unpreserved error will be
disposed of differently under the ineffective assistance of counsel
test than under the fundamental error test. In at least one instance
the court in effect equated the two tests, holding that where counsel
had no reasonable basis for failing to object, the failure was fundamental error and counsel's representation was ineffective.' 1 The ineffective counsel standard does not impeach reasonable strategic
decisions by counsel.52 Similarly, in applying the fundamental error
doctrine the court has sometimes required the defendant to show
that counsel's failure to object was not part of a trial strategy.13 Thus
the determinative factors may in many cases be identical under
both tests.54
It is also questionable that the Clair decision will have the effect
of reducing the caseload of appellate courts. Under a post49. Id. at 292. But see Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077,
1080 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Finer], suggesting as a viable standard "whether counsel
exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are fairly
skilled in the criminal law and who have a fair amount of experience at the criminal bar."
(emphasis in original).
50. 326 A.2d at 274. In addition, a psychological factor may cloud the decision-making
process in cases raising the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel. A court could not ignore the
stigma which would attach to any attorney whose conduct was declared so ineffective as to
constitute "a mockery of justice." This must be contrasted to the situation on-direct when a
claim of fundamental error is raised. There the effectiveness of counsel is not directly put in
issue; the inquiry goes to the overall fairness of the defendant's trial.
51. Commonwealth v. Miller, 448 Pa. 114, 290 A.2d 62 (1972) (counsel's failure to object
to error had the effect of destroying the defendant's only defense).
52. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
53. Commonwealth v. Miller, 448 Pa. 114, 123, 290 A.2d 62, 67 (1972).
54. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act is intended to correct errors of constitutional dimensions. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3 (Supp. 1975) provides for thirteen types of constitutional errors which compel relief. In cases applying the fundamental error doctrine, that the
error had constitutional dimensions did not automatically determine that it was fundamental
error. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text. Deprivation of a substantive constitutional right, however, may have been the only readily identifiable category of error which the
courts deemed to be fundamental. TEMPLE Comment, supra note 27, at 229 & n.12.
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conviction petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, more

so than with other claims that may be made under the Act, it is
likely that the hearing court will grant an evidentiary hearing before
ruling on the merits of the claim.5 5 In addition, adverse rulings are
appealable to a higher court. 8 As the Clair dissenters emphasized,
the saving of judicial resources envisioned by the majority may not
materialize." It is most likely that the cost of the administration of
criminal justice will not be reduced but will be merely redistributed
among defendants and trial and appellate courts.
The factors relevant to Clair'seffect on judicial economy are relevant as well to the court's contention that the decision will encourage the finality of trial court holdings.58 Although Clairwill reduce
the claims of error on direct appeal, the finality of the decision can
still be challenged in collateral proceedings. In fact, it appears that
the most effective way to create more finality in criminal cases
would be to inject that finality at the direct appeal stage. 9 Although
the court may believe that a collateral proceeding is a more expeditious process,10 it seems to be more practical to dispose of all possible
claims on direct appeal. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides
that once an issue has been finally litigated on direct appeal it may
not be raised in a collateral proceeding. 1 By hearing all possible
55. Commonwealth v. Stull, 439 Pa. 20, 266 A.2d 477 (1970); Commonwealth v. Benjamin,
219 Pa. Super. 344, 280 A.2d 625 (1971).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-11 (Supp. 1975) provides:
The party aggrieved by an order [of the hearing court] may, 'within thirty days from
the day on which the order is issued, appeal to the court having appellate jurisdiction
over the original conviction.
57. 326 A.2d at 275.
58. Id. at 274.
59. See TEMPLE Comment, supra note 27, at 238.
60. Thus claims of error need not be dealt with individually on direct appeal, but are
approached through a general inquiry into effectiveness of counsel in collateral proceedings.
For instance, cf. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 987 (1973) suggesting that the United States Supreme Court is relying increasingly on the concept of competent representation to deny
prisoners review of the merits of their claims. But see text accompanying notes 45-50 supra.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(d) (Supp. 1975) provides in part:
To be eligible for relief under this act, a person . . . must prove...: [tihat the error
resulting in his conviction and sentence has not been finally litigated or waived.
Id. §§ 1180-4(a)(2), (3) provide:
[Ain issue is finally litigated if . . . [the] Superior Court . . . of Pennsylvania has
ruled on the merits of the issue and the petitioner has knowingly and understandingly
failed to avail himself of further appeals; or . . . [t]he Supreme Court . . . of Pennsylvania has ruled on the merits of the issue.
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claims of error, whether preserved or not, on direct appeal, the
number of collateral proceedings could be reduced.
CONCLUSION

The fundamental error doctrine served the valid purpose of protecting the criminal defendant by providing a mechanism to insure
overall fairness in his trial. In allowing relief on appeal despite an
attorney's failure to object below, it was an exception to the general
premise of the adversary system that a defendant chooses his advocate and should bear the consequences of the attorney's mistakes. 2
With the growing burden on appellate courts and the availability of
a collateral remedy in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to
cure errors of constitutional dimension, the need for the doctrine
appeared to be diminished. The court so held in Clair.
Clair'suse of a rationale which may be appropriate for the abrogation of the doctrine in civil cases undermines the persuasiveness of
its holding. The court failed to consider that in criminal cases, as
distinguished from civil cases, counsel is more often appointed than
retained. Furthermore, in criminal cases there are more effective
and appropriate methods of improving the quality of representation
given to defendants than by abrogating the doctrine of basic and
fundamental error. 3 The court also failed to give weight to the differences between the interests in life and liberty at stake in criminal
cases and the pecuniary interests at stake in civil cases.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Clair focused on the need to
improve trial advocacy, placing more responsibility on the bar to
assure the validity of trial court holdings and thereby reduce the
strain of increasing appellate caseloads. While the objective is valid,
Clair reflects the philosophy that courts, both trial and appellate,
are essentially passive, and that the burden of maintaining the adversary character of the system should fall on the shoulders of trial
counsel. Arguably the court could have considered an alternative
62. In 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 856, at 374-75 (1969) the author
makes this point in discussing the analogous federal plain error rule.
63. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 263, 322 A.2d 114, 119 (1974)
(Pomeroy, J., concurring & dissenting); see Finer, supra note 49, at 1116-20 (requiring attorneys to pass special examinations dealing with criminal procedure, evidence, and trial tactics,
providing defense counsel with a check list of functions to be performed preparatory to trial,
and increasing compensation paid to appointed attorneys).
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approach that would have retained the salutary features of the fundamental error doctrine without condoning inadequate trial preparation or abuse of the doctrine. If allegations of basic and fundamental error, coupled with an inquiry into whether procedural defaults
were the result of a deliberate bypass and trial strategy 4 were heard
on direct appeal, every possible claim which the defendant could
raise would be directly examined. Strategic defaults would be disposed of and defendants would not be penalized for counsel's or the
trial judge's inadvertence or mistake. Relief dispensed on direct
appeal would relieve the burden on the avenues of collateral proceedings. Further, time and resources would be saved for the defendant (and counsel who represents him), thus accommodating both
the interest of the defendant and the state.
Margaret K. Krasik

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-PUBLIC FORUMCAPTIVE AUDIENCE-TRANSIT ADVERTISING ON MUNICIPALLY OWNED

TRANSIT SYSTEM-The United States Supreme Court has held

that a municipality does not violate a candidate's right of free
speech and equal protection under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution when it sells space on its
transit vehicles for commercial and service advertisements but refuses to accept political advertising of a candidate for public office.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
Harry J. Lehman, petitioner, sought to promote his candidacy for
public office by purchasing car card space on a transit system owned
and operated by respondent, the City of Shaker Heights.' Although
space was then available, the respondent denied petitioner's re64.

See

TEMPLE

Comment, supra note 27, at 237-38.

1. The text of the proposed advertisement read as follows:
HARRY J. LEHMAN IS OLD-FASHIONED!
ABOUT HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT
State Representative-District 56 [XI Harry J. Lehman
Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299 (1974).

